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I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
A. Jurisdiction, The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1987 & Supp. 
1991) since this appeal is taken from an Order Denying Motions to 
Intervene and for Declaratory Judgment (the "Order"). The Order is 
a final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
The Order denies Labor Services, Inc.'s ("LSI") motion to 
intervene in the above-entitled action. An order denying an 
application for intervention which makes a final disposition of the 
claims and assertions of the applicant is appealable. Tracy v. 
University of Utah Hosp. , 619 P.2d 340, 341 (Utah 1980). The Order 
finally disposes of LSI's claims and assertions based on LSI's 
right to intervene in this action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. 
B. Nature of Proceeding. Commencing July 14, 19 89, and 
continuing until October 19, 1989, LSI provided temporary labor 
services for the construction of a new residence pursuant to an 
agreement with the general contractor. LSI did not receive payment 
and timely filed a Claim and Notice of Mechanic's Lien (the "Notice 
of Lien") . On October 23, 1990, LSI filed a motion to intervene in 
this action. 
LSI appeals from the Order and separate Ruling on Labor 
Service Inc.'s Motion to Intervene (the "Ruling") of the Third 
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Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Leonard H. Russon 
presiding. The trial court held that LSI's action to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien was commenced more than one year after the date LSI 
provided its last services. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") 
125-26). The trial court also held that the Claim and Notice of 
Mechanic's Lien filed by LSI did not comply with mechanic's lien 
statute. (R. 126). The trial court reached the conclusion that 
even if LSI had commenced its foreclosure action within the 
limitation period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11, LSI's 
Notice of Lien was legally insufficient and unenforceable. (R. 
126) . 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien filed 
by a subcontractor more than one year after completion of the 
subcontract between the subcontractor and the general contractor 
but within one year after work was suspended for thirty (30) days 
on the original contract between the general contractor and the 
owner of the property is within the limitation period provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1988 & Supp. 1991) 
2. Whether the property description contained in a Claim and 
Notice of Mechanic's Lien substantially complies with Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-7(2)(d) (1988 & Supp. 1991) where the notice of lien 
informs interested persons that a lien exists on sufficiently 
identifiable property and the complaining party has not been misled 
or prejudiced by the notice. 
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Standard of Review, The applicable standard of review for both 
issues presented for review in this case is the correction of error 
standard. This appeal presents two questions concerning how Utah's 
Mechanic's Lien Law should be applied to this particular undisputed 
fact situation. Accordingly, this Court should review the trial 
court's ruling for correctness but accord the trial court's 
findings no particular deference. This Court is free to render an 
independent interpretation of the questions of law in this case. 
See Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp. , 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co. . 
770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988); Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1988); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
III. RELEVANT TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 38-1-2 (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined. 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by 
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in this 
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, 
and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials 
shall be deemed subcontractors. 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 38 -1-7 (1) - (2) (1988 &Supp. 1991). 
Notice of Claim - - Contents - - Recording - - Service on 
owner of property. 
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the 
benefit of this chapter within 80 days after substantial 
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completion of the project or improvements shall file for 
record with the county recorder of the county in which 
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, 
a written notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This letter shall contain a statement setting 
forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if 
known, or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he 
was employed or to whom he furnished the 
equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last 
labor or service was performed or the first 
and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, 
sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant 
or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment 
or certificate as required under chapter 3, 
title 57. No acknowledgment or certificate is 
required for any notice filed after April 29, 
1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
UTAH CODE ANTST. S 38-1-11 (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
Enforcement -- Time for -- Lis Pendens -- Action for debt 
not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for 
must be begun within 12 months after the completion of 
the original contract, or the suspension of work there-
under for a period of 3 0 days. Within the 12 months 
herein mentioned, the lien claimant shall file full 
record with the county recorder of each county in which 
the lien is recorded and notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the 
title or right to possession of real property, or the 
liens shall be void, except as to persons who have been 
made parties to the action and persons having actual 
knowledge of the commencement of the action, and the 
burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those 
claiming under him to show such actual knowledge. 
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Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or 
affect the rights of any person to whom a debt may be due 
for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a 
personal action to recover the same. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-13 (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
Parties -- Joinder -- Intervention. 
Lienors not contesting the claim of each other may 
join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions are com-
menced the court may consolidate them and make all 
persons having claims filed parties to the action. Those 
claiming liens who fail or refuse to become parties 
plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and anyone not 
made a party may at any time before the final hearing 
intervene. 
RULE 24(a), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely applica-
tion, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an inter-
est relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, 
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented 
by existing parties. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Commencing July 14, 1989, and 
continuing until October 19, 1989, LSI provided temporary labor 
services for the construction of a new residence pursuant to an 
agreement with the general contractor for the project. LSI did not 
receive payment for its services. On December 14, 1989, within 
eighty (80) days after furnishing the last labor at the building 
site, LSI filed the Notice of Lien in the amount of $5,996.67. 
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On or about February 20, 1991, For-Shor Company ("For-Shor") 
commenced an action, in part, to foreclose a mechanic's lien on the 
subject property located at 3941 South Parkview Drive (3915 East), 
Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property")- On October 23, 1990, LSI 
filed a motion to intervene (the "Motion to Intervene") as a 
defendant and lien claimant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-11 
and 13. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
In response to the Motion to Intervene, David W. Early 
("Early"), the owner of the Property, filed an Objection to 
Declaratory Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Cross Complaintant's 
[sic] Motion to Intervene and Cross Claim (the "Motion to Dismiss") 
on the grounds that (i) LSI's action to foreclose its mechanic's 
lien was barred by the 12-month statute of limitation provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 and (ii) LSI's Claim and Notice of Lien 
failed to properly describe the Property. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. The trial court denied LSI's 
Motion to Intervene and ruled that LSI's Notice of Lien did not 
comply with the requirements of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Act. The 
trial court also held that LSI's action to foreclose its lien 
against the Property was commenced beyond the statutory limitation 
period and LSI could not be afforded protection under the 
mechanic's lien statute. 
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V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Early is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and the reputed owner of the Property. (R. 91). 
2. On February 8, 1989, Early, as owner, and William Timothy 
Savage d/b/a Savage Construction Company ("Savage"), as general 
contractor, entered into an agreement (the "Original Contract") for 
"the construction of [a] new residence located at Lot #12 [sic] 
Olympus Park Subdivision, Parkview Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah . . 
. ." (R. 64) . 
3. In connection with the Original Contract, Savage and/or 
Statewide Construction, Inc., of which Savage is an officer and 
shareholder, and Labor Services, Inc. ("LSI"), entered into a 
series of contractor/subcontractor agreements (the "Subcontract") 
wherein Savage agreed to pay LSI for temporary labor services 
provided to Savage for the completion of the Original Contract on 
a day-to-day basis. (R. 77-78). The Subcontract referred to the 
street address but not to the legal description of the Property. 
4. Commencing on July 14, 1989, and continuing until October 
19, 1989, LSI duly performed in a competent and workmanlike manner 
the labor and services required by the Subcontract, as a result of 
which LSI became entitled to receive the amount of $5,99 6.67. (R. 
78) . 
5. After LSI made demand for payment upon Savage of the 
$5,99 6.67 in arrears, Savage informed LSI by letter dated November 
16, 1989, that it had removed its equipment and personnel from the 
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Property as of November 7, 1989, thus suspending work on the 
Original Contract as of that date. Savage predicated its action on 
Early's failure to make payments of amounts Early owed to Savage 
pursuant to the Original Contract. (R. 63). 
6. After LSI made repeated demands for payment upon both 
Savage and Early, LSI filed the Notice of Lien pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7(1) on December 14, 19 89, within eighty days 
from the date LSI furnished the last labor in connectior with the 
construction on the Property. (R. 65-66) . The Notice of Lien was 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, Entry No. 
4860194 in Book 6183 at Page 3032 of the Official Records. The 
Notice of Lien states that the reputed owner of the land and 
premises located thereon is Dcivid Early, that the reasonable value 
of the services provided by LSI was in the amount of $5,996.67, and 
the property to be charged with the lien is located at 3941 South 
Parkview Drive (3915 East), Salt Lake City, Utah, and more 
particularly described as "Lot 12 Olympus Park subdivision . . . . " 
(R. 65-66). 
7. The Notice of Lien correctly describes the street address 
of the Property as 3941 South Parkview Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
LSI relied on the property description in the Original Contract for 
the lot number contained in the Notice of Lien. (R. 64). Savage 
provided LSI with a copy of the Original Contract on November 20, 
1989. 
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8. On or about June 21, 1990, after the expiration of the 
statutory eighty (80) day period, LSI discovered that the Property 
is actually located on Lot 112 Mount Olympus Park Subdivision, not 
Lot 12 Olympus Park Subdivision. (R. 91). 
9. On or about February 20, 1990, For-Shor Company ("For-
Shor") commenced this action, in part, to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien on the Early Property. LSI filed its Motion to Intervene 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-11 and 13 (1987 & Supp. 1990). 
LSI's Motion to Intervene and Lis Pendens were filed on October 23, 
1990. (R. 2-25) . 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
LSI COMMENCED THE ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN WITHIN 
THE STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD AND LSI'S NOTICE OF CLAIM OF 
MECHANIC'S LIEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
LSI provided labor services in connection with a construction 
project that directly increased the value of the Early's Property 
by $5,996.67. LSI has not received payment for its services. LSI, 
as a subcontractor under the Original Contract between Early, as 
the Property owner, and Savage, as the general contractor, timely 
filed its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien on October 23, 
1990, less than twelve months after November 7, 1989, the date 
Savage suspended work on the Original Contract. It is indisputable 
that LSI, as a subcontractor, filed its foreclosure action within 
the limitation period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11. Even 
if LSI could be classified as an original contractor, however, 
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LSI's foreclosure action was still commenced within the limitation 
period for original contractors. 
The description contained in the Claim and Notice of 
Mechanic's Lien filed by LSI against the subject Property 
substantially complies with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2)(d). Under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, LSI's description of the 
subject Property provided sufficient identification and gave notice 
to all interested persons that a li^n existed against the Property. 
In the absence of prejudice to the complainant, and in light of the 
remedial nature of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act, the lien should be 
upheld. 
The trial court erred in its application of the mechanic's 
lien statute. The trial court's determination that LSI's 
foreclosure action was untimely and that LSI's Claim and Notice of 
Mechanic's Lien was legally insufficient was incorrect. This Court 
is free to independently apply the law to the facts presented in 
this case and correct the errors made by the trial court. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
LSI COMMENCED THE ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN WITHIN 
THE STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD AND LSI'S NOTICE OF CLAIM OF 
MECHANIC'S LIEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
LSI, as a subcontractor, provided services for the completion 
of a construction project in the amount of $5,996.67 for which it 
has never received payment. When LSI attempted to foreclose it's 
mechanic's lien within twelve (12) months after the completion of 
the Original Contract between the primary contractor and the owner 
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of the Property, the trial court incorrectly applied the limitation 
period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11. The trial court's 
error resulted in an unjust denial of the protection afforded by 
Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law to laborers who have added directly to 
the value of the property owned by another. It is indisputable 
that LSI complied with the procedural requirements of Utah's 
Mechanic's Lien Law and is therefore entitled to the remedy the 
legislature intended to provide to laborers and materialmen. 
A. LSI FILED ITS ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY WITHIN THE LIMITATION PERIOD 
PROVIDED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11. 
LSI filed its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien against 
the Property on October 23, 1990, less than twelve months after the 
date Savage suspended work on the Original Contract. LSI filed its 
foreclosure action within the limitation period provided by Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-11. 
Section 38-1-11, Utah Code Ann., provides that: " [a]ctions to 
enforce liens herein provided for must be begun within twelve 
months after the completion of the original contract, or the 
suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days . . . " 
(emphasis added). In Roberts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190, 479 P.2d 
345 (1971), this Court noted that the foregoing provision is 
appropriately considered in connection with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
2, which defines the term "original contractor" as: 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by 
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in this 
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, 
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and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials 
shall be deemed subcontractors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-2 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
The completion date or the suspension date, whichever is 
later, of the "original contract" is the measuring event in 
determining the timeliness of an action to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien. The completion or suspension of a subcontract is not 
relevant to the calculation of the limitation period. Suspension 
of work on the entire construction project also is not a relevant 
factor in computing the limitation period. Case law interpreting 
Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law supports this conclusion. 
In Roberts, the plaintiff builder attempted to avoid 
application of the definition of "original contractor" in order to 
classify himself as a subcontractor and take advantage of the 
filing period determined by the completion date of the original 
contract. In this case, however, the plaintiff builder had an 
express oral agreement with the Hansens to build a home on real 
property in Box Elder County that the Hansens were purchasing from 
the Ballards. The Hansens dismissed the builder on October 25, 
1968, before the construction project was completed. Eleven days 
later the builder filed a notice of lien against property which 
stated that October 19, 19618, was the last date the builder 
furnished labor or materials to the property. 
The trial court dismissed the action based on the twelve 
(12) month limitation period which applies to original contracts 
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under § 38-1-11. The builder did not commence an action to 
foreclose his lien until November 14, 1969, one-year and two weeks 
after the builder had last furnished labor and materials to the 
property. In order to avoid the application of the definition of 
"the original contract," the builder argued that the primary or 
"original contract" for construction of a home on the property was 
between the Hansens (the purchasers) and the Ballards (the 
sellers). Therefore, the builder reasoned, (i) the Ballards, as 
holders of the legal title, were the "owners", (ii) the builder's 
agreement was with the Hansens and he had no contract with the 
Ballards, (iii) the builder should be regarded as a subcontractor 
of the Hansens, and (iv) since the home was completed less than one 
year before he filed his action, his action was commenced on time. 
Roberts, 479 P.2d at 346. 
This Court rejected the builder's argument because the 
builder's agreement was with the Hansens, as "owners" under § 38-1-
2. The Hansens' agreement with the builder was an "original 
contract" and not a subcontract as the builder contended. Since 
the "original contract" was terminated on October 25, 1968, more 
than twelve (12) months before the builder filed his foreclosure 
action on November 4, 19 69, the builder could not obtain the 
benefit of his lien. Id. The Roberts Court did not expressly 
address the consequences that might have obtained if the builder 
could have been classified as a subcontractor, in part, it can be 
assumed, because the answer is so obvious. 
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It is clear, however, from the Court's discussion of the 
interrelatedness of § 38-1-2 and § 38-1-11 that if the plaintiff 
builder had been a subcontractor rather than the original 
contractor, the builder's action to foreclose his mechanic's lien 
would have been timely under § 38-1-11. The statute could not be 
more clear: The twelve (12) month limitation period provided by § 
38-1-11 begins to run upon completion or suspension of the original 
contract, not the completion or suspension of a subcontract 
thereunder. 
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals considered a similar set 
of facts when determining the timeliness of an action to foreclose 
a mechanic's lien in Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 
P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Court of Appeals upheld the 
summary judgment dismissing a painting contractor's foreclosure 
action because the one-year limitation on actions to foreclose 
mechanics' liens barred the primary contractor's foreclosure 
action. Although the painting contractor completed his work on 
February 14, 19 86, he contended that construction on the house was 
not complete until after July 1986, and his foreclosure action 
filed on June 23, 1987, was within the one-year statutory period. 
Judge Billings found it important to note that the painting 
contractor's alleged contract was directly with the owner. "Copier 
Painting was thus a primary contractor and not a subcontractor as 
is often the situation where painting work is performed." Id. at 
172, n. 11. The Court of Appeals held that the painting contractor 
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had completed the performance on its primary contract on February 
14, 19 86, and the statutory period began to run on that date. 
"Accordingly, Copier Painting's filing of this action on June 23, 
1987, was untimely under section 38-1-11 as it was not filed within 
twelve months of the completion of the original contract." Id. at 
173 (emphasis added) . Again, the Court of Appeals did not 
expressly discuss what the outcome of the case might have been if 
the painting contractor had been a subcontractor because those 
facts were not before the court. It necessarily follows, however, 
that if the painting contractor in this case had not contracted 
directly with the owner but had supplied materials and labor as a 
subcontractor, his foreclosure action would have been timely filed. 
1. LSI is not an "original contractor" as defined by 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-2. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that LSI is not an 
original contractor within the meaning of § 38-1-2. Early, as 
owner, contracted directly with Savage for the construction of a 
new residence on the Property. (R. 64) . LSI did not expressly or 
impliedly contract with Early. Instead, LSI and Savage entered 
into a series of subcontractor agreements wherein Savage agreed to 
pay LSI for temporary labor services provided for the completion of 
the project. Since LSI never contracted with the Property owner, 
LSI is not an original contractor. 
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2. LSI, as a subcontractor, filed its action to 
foreclose its mechanic's lien within twelve months 
after Savage suspended work on the original 
contract. 
In this case, the Original Contract between Early and Savage 
was suspended on November 7, 1989. (R. 63). LSI did not become 
aware that Early had dismissed Savage until Savage informed LSI by 
letter dated November 16, 1989. (R. 63). As a subcontractor 
rather than an "original contractor", LSI had twelve (12) months to 
file an action to foreclose its mechanic's lien after work on the 
Original Contract had been suspended for thirty (30) days. A 
foreclosure action by LSI, therefore, would not have been time 
barred until December 7, 1989. LSI filed its Motion to Intervene, 
Lis Pendens, and the Answer, Cross-claim and Counterclaim on 
October 23, 1990, well within the statutory limitation period 
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11. 
3. Even if LSI is regarded as an original contractor, 
LSI filed its foreclosure action within twelve 
months after it suspended work on the Property for 
thirty days. 
Even if the Subcontract between LSI and Savage is regarded as 
an original contract, however, LSI filed its foreclosure action 
within twelve (12) months after it suspended work on the Property 
for thirty (30) days. If LSI is regarded as an "original 
contractor", the statute affords LSI a choice of bringing a 
foreclosure action within twelve months after the completion of its 
contract with Savage, or, bringing a foreclosure action within 
twelve months after there had been a suspension of work for a 
16 
period of thirty days, whichever is later. See Mickelsen v. 
Crajgco, Inc.. 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989), quoting Totorica v. 
Thomas. 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965). 
In Mickelsen and Totorica, this Court considered the 
conjunctive language of § 38-1-11 and concluded that such a 
conjunctive implies a choice. In the earlier case, the Totorica 
Court considered a foreclosure action commenced by an original 
contractor more than twelve months after there had been a 
suspension of work for more than thirty (30) days but less than 
twelve (12) months after the contract was complete. The Totorica 
Court concluded that a "lien claimant's" action was not barred just 
because a suspension of work for thirty (30) days had occurred 
during any period while the contract was being performed and the 
contract was not completed for more than twelve (12) months after 
such suspension of work. Totorica, 397 P.2d at 986-87. More 
recently, in Mickelsen, the Court reiterated the Totorica holding 
in a case involving another original contractor in nearly identical 
factual circumstances. 
Neither Totorica nor Mickelsen distinguish between original 
contractors and subcontractors for the purpose of establishing the 
limitation period under § 38-1-11 because both cases involve 
original contractors. Both cases stand or the proposition that the 
conjunctive language of the statute provides "lien claimants" with 
a choice between bringing a foreclosure action "twelve (12) months 
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after the completion of his contract,"1 or within twelve (12) 
months after there has been a suspension of work for a period of 
thirty (30) days, whichever is later. Mickelsen, 767 P.2d at 563. 
The Totorica Court based its decision on the rationale that 
the mechanic's lien law was enacted for the benefit of those who 
perform the labor and supply the materials and that the lien 
claimant's remedy should not be limited without a clear mandate 
from the legislature. Id. at 986. Under ^ .he fact situation in the 
instant case, even if Totorica and Mickelsen are interpreted to 
mean that the term "original contract" in § 38-1-7 was not intended 
to be considered in connection with the term "original contractor" 
in § 38-1-2 as contended by Early, LSI still commenced its 
foreclosure action within twelve months after November 18, 19 89, 
which was the thirtieth day after work was suspended on the 
Subcontract between Savage and LSI. There is not, however, a clear 
mandate from the legislature that § 38-1-2 and § 38-1-11 should not 
be considered as interrelated provisions and LSI is not an 
1
 In opposition to LSI's Motion to Intervene, Early contended 
that a "close reading" of the language in Totorica and Mickelsen 
supports the conclusion "that 'original contractor' does not refer 
to the contract between the owner and the general contractor but 
applies to the contract between the subcontractor and the general 
contractor." (R. 130). Evidently, Early bases his conclusion on 
the Court's use of the indefinite pronoun "his" when referring to 
the lien claimant. However, in both Totorica and Mickelsen, the 
Court was presented with lien claimants who were both primary 
contractors. Neither case deals with foreclosure actions by 
subcontractors. Anything more than a mere cursory reading of 
Totorica and Mickelsen cannot support Early's contention. 
18 
"original contractor" for purposes of calculating the limitation 
period under § 38-1-11. 
4. The trial court erred in its application of the 
limitation period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-11 to the commencement date of LSI's lien 
foreclosure action. 
The trial court erred in its determination that LSI commenced 
its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien beyond the limitation 
period provided by § 38-1-11. As a subcontractor, LSI could bring 
an action to foreclose its mechanic's lien either twelve months 
after the Original Contract was complete, or in this case since 
Savage did not have the opportunity to complete the Original 
Contract, within twelve months after work had been suspended on the 
Original Contract for thirty (30) days. Under the correct 
interpretation of § 38-1-2 and § 38-1-11, LSI commenced its 
foreclosure action on time. Even if LSI is regarded as an 
"original contractor," LSI brought its foreclosure action within 
twelve (12) months after work had been suspended on the Subcontract 
and the action filed on October 23, 1990, was not time barred. 
LSI provided labor services for the construction project on 
the Property which directly increased the value of the Property. 
LSI timely filed its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien and is 
entitled to a determination of the priority of its lien against the 
Property and satisfaction of its lien from the proceeds of the 
foreclosure sale of the Property. 
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B. LSI'S NOTICE OF LIEN IS VALID AMD SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES 
WITH UTAH CODE ANN, § 38-1-7, 
The property description contained in the Notice of Lien filed 
by LSI against the subject Property substantially complies with 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2) (d) which requires lien claimants to 
provide a property description sufficient for identification. 
LSI's identification of the Property gave notice to all interested 
persons that a lien was claimed against the Property. In the 
absence of prejudice to Early, and in light of the remedial nature 
of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law, LSI's mechanic's lien should be 
upheld. 
The trial court erred in its determination that the property 
description contained in the Notice of Lien was legally 
insufficient for identification purposes. Utah courts have 
recognized that substantial compliance with the provisions of the 
mechanic's lien statutes is all that is required of a lien 
claimant. In this situation, a rigorous interpretation of the 
mechanic's lien statute in not necessary to protect the interests 
of the parties. Case law in Utah and several other jurisdictions 
supports a liberal construction of mechanic's lien laws. 
1. Mechanic's lien statutes are liberally 
construed to give effect to their remedial 
character. 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan, 79 8 
P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) , is the most recent opinion of this Court 
regarding the sufficiency of the property description contained in 
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a notice of mechanic's lien. In that case, a general contractor 
appealed from a summary judgment invalidating its mechanic's lien 
against property developed as a condominium project. Several 
lenders attacked the sufficiency of the description contained in 
the contractor's lien. Judge Orme, sitting by designation, began 
his analysis of whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment against the lenders with a thorough discussion of the 
nature and purpose of Utah's mechanic's lien law. 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature 
and seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to the value of the property of another by 
their material or labor. Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743 
(quoting Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 
1982) .2 
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may 
only acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provisions 
authorizing them. Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743; Utah Sav. 
& Loan Assoc, v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338, 366 P.2d 598, 600 
(1961). "However, Utah courts have recognized that substantial 
compliance with these provisions is all that is required." Projects 
See, e.g., Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1982); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 
(1965); King Bros, v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254 (Utah 1962); 
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207 (Utah 1959) ; Rio 
Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1918); Bailey 
v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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Unlimited. 798 2d at 743-44 (emphasis added); Graff v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983); Chase v. Dawson. 117 
Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 390,390 (1950). "Moreover, we have stated 
that '[a] lien once acquired by labor performed on a building with 
the consent of the owner should not . . . be defeated by 
technicalities, when no rights of others are infringed, and no 
express command of the statute is disregarded.'" Projects 
Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quoting Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 
Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906)). Courts of other states also 
subscribe to this view. See, e.g. , H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical 
Contractors of Alaska. Inc.. 563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977); 
Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co.. 713 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1986) . 
"Although courts have differing opinions about how liberally 
to construe provisions within their mechanic's lien statutes, xthe 
modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules which have no 
demonstrable value in a particular fact situation.7" Projects 
Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quoting Consolidated Elec. Distribs., 
Inc. v. Jepson Elec. Contracting, 272 Ore. 376, 380, 537 P.2d 80, 
83 (1975)). Courts repeatedly hold that labor and materialman's 
lien laws should be liberally construed and applied in order to 
reasonably and fairly carry out their remedial intent. See Adobe 
Brick and Supply Co. v. Centex-Winston Corp., 270 So.2d 755, 757 
(Fla. 1972) (omission or error in claim of lien does not prevent 
enforcement of lien as long as property can be identified from 
description); General Electric Supply Co. v. Bennett. 626 P.2d 844, 
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846 (Mont. 1981)(whether given description is sufficient depends of 
surrounding circumstances); Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc., 561 P.2d 
750, 755 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)(substantial compliance not 
inconsistent with remedial nature of mechanic's lien law); C-3 
Builders, Inc. v. Krueger, 642 P.2d 344, 345 (Ore. Ct. App. 
19 82)(substantial compliance with statutory requirements 
sufficient). Utah is no exception to the modern trend. 
In Projects Unlimited, Judge Orme noted that Utah has followed 
the modern trend in the legislature and the courts. The 1985 
amendments to the mechanic's lien law simplified the mechanic's 
lien notice and in Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1989), this Court dispensed with the notion that the claimant's 
verification required any formal ritual. Id. at 563. 
In Midway Lumber, the court found that a liberal construction 
of the Arizona mechanic's lien statute (identical to Utah's 
statute) meant that the steps required to impose a mechanic's lien 
"must be followed, but in determining what these steps are the 
court should give the words a meaning which is reasonable, 
consistent with all the language used, and conducive to the purpose 
to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute." Midway 
Lumber, 561 P.2d at 755. 
Courts generally eschew a technical approach to property 
descriptions in notices of claims. Lien statutes "must be 
liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to 
promote justice." Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating Inc. v. 
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Earth Resources Co., 684 P.2d 322 (Idaho 1984) ; Chief Indus. . Inc. 
v. Schwendiman, 587 P.2d 823 (Idaho 1978) . Courts do not interpret 
the various, but similar mechanic's lien statutes to require a 
technical legal description. Adobe Brick, 270 So.2d at 757; C-3 
Builders, 642 P.2d at 345; Fircrest Supply, Inc. v. Plummer, 634 
P.2d 891, 893 (Wash. App. 1981). 
LSI clearly has established its right to protection under 
Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law by complying with all applicable 
procedural requirements. LSI's Notice of Lien contained a property 
description sufficient to identify the Property. Denying LSI the 
benefit of its mechanic's lien based on a technicality would be 
inconsistent with the remedial nature of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law 
and the trend toward liberal construction of this statute to 
accomplish this remedial purpose. 
2. Any error or mistake in the property description does not 
affect the validity of the lien if the property can be 
identified by the description. 
Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of Utah's mechanic's lien statute 
identify the statutory elements of a lien notice. At the time this 
dispute arose, § 38-1-7(2)(d) provided that every notice of lien 
recorded with the county recorder must contain, among other things, 
"a description of the property, sufficient for identification." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2) (d) . In Projects Unlimited, Judge Orme 
noted that the descriptive terms in a lien notice is to adequately 
inform interested parties of the existence and scope of the lien. 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 747; see also Park City Meat Co. v. 
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Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 155, 103 P. 254, 260 
(1906). "Courts look to see whether interested parties have been 
informed of the existence of the lien and whether the lien has 
misled or prejudiced those parties. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. 
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 490, 700 P.2d 109, 112 
(Ct. App. 1985); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 
(Wyo. 1986) (lien which contained "no adequate description of the 
property" upheld where not claim of prejudice or being misled). 
"When lien notices have sufficiently informed interested persons 
that a lien exists on identifiable property and the complaining 
party has not been misled by the notice, the purpose of the 
provisions has not been thwarted and courts are inclined to find 
substantial compliance." Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 747; see 
e.g., Horseshoe Estates, 713 P.2d at 781. 
a. A property description is sufficient if 
persons familiar with the locality can 
identify the property from the description. 
Other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have 
created a substantial body of law regarding the sufficiency of the 
property description required in a claim and notice of mechanic's 
lien. Based on a foundation of liberal construction, courts 
consistently hold that if the description of the property contained 
in the lien notice is sufficient to enable a person of ordinary 
intelligence, who is familiar with the locality, to point it out as 
the only one corresponding with the description, it meets ail the 
statutory requirements. General Electric Supply, 626 P.2d at 846; 
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Treasure Valley, 684 P.2d at 325; Turnboo v. Keele. 383 P.2d 591, 
593 (Idaho 1963); Howard A, Deason & Co. v. Costa Tierra Ltd., 83 
Cal. Rptr. 105, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). In seeking to determine 
if a party familiar with the locality can identify the property 
from the description, "whether a given description is sufficient or 
not depends upon the surrounding circumstances, the character of 
the particular building, its situation with reference to others, 
etc." General Electric Supply, 626 P.2d at 846; Midland Coal & 
Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 202 P. 389, 390 (Mont. 1921). 
The Texas Supreme Court considered a factual situation almost 
identical to the instant case in Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe, 
332 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1959). In Rheem, the parties agreed that the 
only issue to be decided on a motion for summary judgment was the 
sufficiency of a lien description in a lien contract that correctly 
recited the street address but described the property as "Lot #9" 
where the proper description was "Lot #19". The court summarily 
decided that as between the lien holder and the original owner of 
the property, the lien containing the correct street address was 
absolutely valid and enforceable against the original owner. The 
Rheem court adopted the "best rule" that if there appears to be 
enough in the description to enable a party familiar with the 
locality to identify the premises to the exclusion of all others, 
the description will be sufficient. Id. at 355. The court took 
judicial notice of the fact that there would not be two houses in 
the same city of Irving, Dallas County, that had the same street 
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address. "Certainly such a description would have been sufficient 
to enable a party familiar with the location to identify the 
premises intended to be described with reasonable certainty." Id. 
The only difference between Rheem and the instant case is the 
involvement of a third-party subsequent purchaser in Rheem. In 
this case, only LSI and Early, the Property owner, are involved. 
LSI's Notice of Lien correctly identified the street address of the 
Property and Early had actual notice of LSI's lien against the 
Property. Certainly Early cannot argue that he was confused as to 
the property involved. 
b. A property description is sufficient if after 
elimination of the erroneous portion, enough 
remains to identify the property sought to 
charged with the lien. 
In cases where the property description contained in a notice 
of lien contained error, several courts have upheld liens if, by 
rejecting what is erroneous in the description contained in the 
lien, enough remains to identify the particular property sought to 
be charged. General Electric Supply, 626 P.2d at 846; Howard A. 
Deason & Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. at 114. Using the correct portion of 
the description contained in LSI's Notice of Lien, the Property is 
described as 3941 South Parkview Drive (3915 East) , Salt Lake City, 
Utah. There is only one address is Salt Lake City that corresponds 
with the street address contained in LSI's Notice of Lien. It is 
clear that a person familiar with this locality could identify the 
property subject to LSI's claim of lien using only the correct 
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street address contained in the Notice of Lien. The property 
description contained in LSI's Notice of Lien substantially 
complies with the requirement that the lien contain a description 
sufficient to identify the subject property. 
It is important to note that this is not a case where the 
property description is unambiguously erroneous. In other words, 
the description of the premises charged with the lien does not 
clearly identify the wror.g parcel to the exclusion of all others. 
For example, in Ross v. Olson, 523 P.2d 518 (Idaho 1974), 
improvements were made to one portion of a large parcel of property 
and the mechanic's lien positively and exactly identified the wrong 
portion of the parcel. The court ruled that the lien claimant had 
not achieved substantial compliance with the lien statute and the 
lien was fatally defective. See also, Brunecz v. DiLeo, 283 A.2d 
606 (Md. Ct. App. 1971); Banco Mortgage Co. v. E.G. Miller Enters., 
264 N.W.2d 399, 400 (Minn. 1978); DiCamillo v. Navitsky, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Sequatchie Concrete Serv., Inc. 
v. Cutter Labs, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). 
In the instant case, there is not a positive or unambiguous 
description of the wrong piece of property. The Notice of Lien 
contains the correct street address and identifies Early as the 
owner. The only error contained in the Notice of Lien was the 
omission of the numeral one (1) from the lot number and the word 
"Mount" from the name of the subdivision. By comparison, in cases 
where the lien claimant made a completely incorrect identification, 
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the lien was invalid because it failed to provide any notice of the 
property that was charged with the lien. The discrepancy between 
the lot number and the street address creates ambiguity in the 
description rather than positively identifying the wrong property. 
The Notice of Lien still provides an adequate description 
sufficient to identify the property charged with the lien. Any 
question in this regard is eliminated by the presence of Early as 
the only party involved, Early's actual notice of the existence of 
LSI's mechanic's lien and the absence of innocent subsequent 
purchasers. 
3. LSI is in substantial compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-7 and LSI's lien against the Early 
Property is valid and enforceable. 
Substantial compliance with the mechanic's lien statutes is 
consistent with the remedial nature of the statute has been found 
to be sufficient to create a valid and enforceable mechanic's lien. 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743-44; Leeson v. Bartol, 99 P.2d 
485 (Ariz. 1940); Midway Lumber, 561 P.2d at 755; Banco Mortgage, 
264 N.We2d at 400; Morrison-Maierle. Inc. v. Selsco, 606 P.2d 1085, 
1087 (Mont. 1980). 
a. Lack of prejudice to the complainant or third-
parties is an important factor when considering 
whether the property description contained in LSI's 
Notice of Lien substantially complies with Utah 
Code Ann. S 38-1-17. 
In discussing the factors of importance in determining 
whether there has been substantial compliance in a given case, the 
Oregon Supreme Court approved the following language from the 
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Indiana Court of Appeals in Beneficial Finance Co. v. Wegmiller 
Bender Labor Co. , 402 ISLE.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) : 
Whether there has been substantial compliance by the lien 
claimant depends upon the degree of non-compliance with 
the letter of the statute, the policy which underlies the 
particular statutory provision in question, and the 
prejudice which may have resulted to either the owner of 
the property or other third parties who have an interest 
in the real estate. 
McGregor Co. v. Heritage, 631 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Ore. 1981). The 
McGregor court also noted that the Indiana holding was consistent 
with prior Oregon cases in recognizing that lack of prejudice to 
the owner or third-party subsequent purchasers is a proper factor 
to consider in determining whether a lien claimant has 
substantially complied with the statutory requirements. See, e.g. , 
C-3 Builders, 642 P*2d at 346; Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Company, 
Inc. , 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986); Buckeye Hauling, Inc. v. Troy, 
43 Ohio Misc. 23, 332 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Com. PI. 1974). 
Turning to the facts of this case, only LSI, and Early, are 
involved. No subsequent purchaser has been misled to his or her 
detriment by the incorrect description, and the owner himself could 
not have been misled by the incorrect Lot number contained in the 
Notice of Lien. In this case. Early himself perpetuated the 
erroneous identification of the building lot by incorrectly 
identifying the lot in the Original Contract (R. 64) and in a 
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letter addressed to "All Suppliers & Subcontractors" dated October 
2, 1989, (R. 134).3 
Although the Notice of Lien referred to Lot 12 Olympus Park 
Subdivision rather than Lot 112 of the Mount Olympus Park 
Subdivision, the deficiency in the description did not result in 
any prejudice to Early. In compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-7(3), LSI provided Early with notice that his property had 
been charged with a mechanic's lien by letter dated February 9, 
1990, and delivered by certified mail. The Property is the subject 
of substantial dispute and Early could not have been misled by the 
minor inaccuracies in the Notice of Lienc Furthermore, Early had 
actual notice of LSI's lien. Even though the description contained 
the wrong building lot number, the description was still sufficient 
to enable Early to identify the property covered by LSI's lien. 
4. The trial court erred in its determination that the 
propertv 
not 
description 
legally 
in 
sufficient 
LSI's 
for 
Notice 
purposes 
of 
c 
Lien was 
if Utah's 
Mechanic's Lien Law. 
Contrary to the trial court's Ruling that the "whole purpose 
of the notice of lien is for recording purpose" (R. 126), the real 
purpose of the lien notice is to inform interested persons that a 
3
 LSI did not receive a copy of the October 2, 1989, letter 
from Early to suppliers and sub-contractors. The letter is 
attached to Early's Reply Memorandum as Exhibit "2". (R. 134). 
Although LSI did not rely on the property description contained in 
the October 2 letter, the letter is further evidence that Early was 
not misled by the description contained in LSI's Notice of Lien 
because he consistently referred to the Property as Lot #12 rather 
than Lot #112. 
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lien exists on identifiable property,, In this particular case, the 
Notice of Lien filed by LSI fulfills that purpose and is legally 
sufficient under Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-7, Moreover, in light of 
(i) the general purpose of Utah's mechanic's lien law to protect 
those who perform labor and provide materials on buildings of 
others, (ii) Early's ability to identify the subject property from 
the description given in the Notice of Lien and, (iii) the lack of 
prejudice to Early or any other third-party, it is apparent that 
the trial court erred in its determination that the Notice of Lien 
was legally insufficient. LSI's Notice of Lien substantially 
complies with the provisions of the Utah's Mechanic's Lien statutes 
and should be upheld by this Court. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, LSI requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's Order and Ruling and allow LSI to intervene in the above-
entitled action to determine the validity and priority of LSI's 
claim and the claims of all other lien holders as provided by law. 
LSI also requests an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
of appeal as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (19 88 & Supp. 
1991) . 
DATED: June 24, 1991, 
HANSEN JONES & LETA 
Blcike D. Mil'ler 
Marji Hanson 
Attorneys for Labor Services, Inc. 
Appellants and Putative Interveners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE"* 
I hereby certify that on June 24, 1991, I caused to be hand-
delivered a true and complete copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
Allan M. Metos 
Counsel for Respondent David W. Early 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
^t/c 
\mh\lsibn"ef .1 
** The Brief of Appellant was inadvertently filed without a reproduction of 
the trial court's order and ruling as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 24(f)(1). The Order Denying Motions to Intervene and for Declaratory 
Judgment dated December 6, 1990, and the Ruling on Labor Service [sic] Inc.'s 
Motion to Intervene dated November 19, 1990, are attached hereto as Addendum 
"A" and "B", respectively. 
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Tab A 
ALLAN M. METOS #2249 
Attorney for Defendant 
David W. Early 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 363-5796 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 0 6 1990 
SALl L A I \ £ G'OLiKi'V 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVID W. EARLY, TRUSTEE; SAVAGE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; STATEWIDE 
CONSTRUCTION; and TIM SAVAGE; 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 
INTERVENE AND FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900901033 CV 
Judge Russon 
LABOR SERVICES, INC. a Utah 
corporation, 
Cross-Claimant, 
vs . 
DAVID W. EARLY, TRUSTEE; SAVAGE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; STATEWIDE 
CONSTRUCTION; and TIM SAVAGE; 
Cross-Claimees. 
oooOooo 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing this 
19th day of November, 1990, before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on the Motions of 
Labor Services, Inc. to intervene and for a declaratory judgment 
and submitted to the Court for decision under Rule 4-501, Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises and good caused appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Labor Services, Inc.'s Motions 
for Declaratory Judgment and to Intervene in the above action are 
denied on the following grounds: 
(1) Labor Services, Inc. failed to file its action on 
the lien within twelve (12) months after completion of its original 
contract as required by 38-1-11 U.C.A. 
(2) Labor Services, Inc.'s Notice of Mechanic Lien did 
not contain a sufficient legal description of the property liened 
as required by 38-1-7 U.C.A. 
DATED this /,--. - 'day of NSvem&er, 1990. 
i
 / / 
Judge 
am.e-fsord 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this _____ day of November, 1990, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motions to 
Intervene and for Declaratory Judgment was mailed by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Duane A. Burnett 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
367 West 1600 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Blake D. Miller, Esq 
Attorney for Labor Services, Inc. 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
anue-fsord 3 
TabB 
NOV 1 3 1890 
•JscU!~r^<^-- r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID W. EARLY, TRUSTEE; 
SAVAGE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; 
STATEWIDE CONSTRUCTION; and 
TIM SAVAGE, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON LABOR SERVICES 
INC.'S MOTION TO INTERVENE 
CIVIL NO. 900901033 CV 
Labor Services, Inc. has filed a Motion to Intervene, for 
Declaratory Judgment, and for Leave to File a Crossclaim in the 
above matter. The said Motions have been submitted to the 
Court for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
This action is a foreclosure action on two mechanic's liens 
brought by plaintiff For-Shor Company. The mechanic's liens 
pertain to plaintiff's materials utilized by other defendants 
en property owned by David W. Early, Trustee. Labor Services, 
Inc. moves to intervene on the basis of its own mechanic's lien 
as to services performed on the said property. Labor Services, 
FOR-SHOR V. EARLY PAGE TWO RULING 
Inc.'s services were rendered on the property, commencing July 
14, 1989 and continuing until October 19, 1989. Its Motion to 
Intervene was filed October 23, 1990. 
Defendant David W. Early, Trustee, objects to the 
intervention upon the grounds that the Complaint was filed more 
than one year after the last services had been performed and, 
Therefore, was statutorily barred. It further argued that the 
lien, itself, was not legally adequate in that it incorrectly 
identified the property being liened, therein failing to comply 
with the requirements of the mechanic's lien statute. 
Labor Services Inc. argues that while it filed its Motion 
after the one year period, other mechanic's lienholders had 
filed the action within the one year period, that being on 
February 20, 1990. It also argues that its error in 
identifying the lot in the subdivision to be Lot 12 instead of 
Lot 112 was not an error sufficient to nullify the validity of 
the lien. 
The Court rules as follows. Labor Services, Inc.'s claim 
and Notice of Mechanic's Lien does not comply with the 
requirements of the mechanic's lien statute. To derive the 
benefits of the mechanic's lien statute, a notice of lien must 
be filed "for record with the county recorder" and must 
FOR-SHOR V. EARLY PAGE THREE RULING 
contain, among other things, "a description of the property, 
sufficient for identification." The said notice was 
insufficient to give notice of lien upon Lot 112, Olympus Park 
Subdivision. The inclusion of the address does not cure the 
statutory requirement since the whole purpose of the notice of 
lien is for recording purposes and the county recorder does not 
file by address of property, but by legal description. 
Furthermore, Legal Services, Inc.'s action upon its lien 
was commenced more than one year after the last services of 
October 19, 1989. Even if the notice of lien had been legally 
sufficient, the action taken by Labor Services, Inc. on October 
23, 1989 was beyond the limitation period. 
For the reasons set forth above, Labor Services, Inc. has 
no protection under the mechanic's lien statute. Of course, it 
nay still pursue its rights against the parties with whom it 
contracted on the debt. 
Labor Services, Inc.'s Motion to Intervene is denied. 
Counsel for David W. Early, Trustee, will prepare the Order. 
Dated t h i s / / dfevt of November, 1990. 
p-e--^-^*^-^-/ fc 
LEONARD H. RUSS6 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
FOR-SHOR V. EARLY PAGE FOUR RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling on Motion to Intervene, to the 
following, this -'/ day of November, 1990: 
Duane A. Burnett 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
367 West 1600 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Allan M. Metos 
Attorney for Defendant Early 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Blake D. Miller 
Marji Hanson 
Attorneys for Labor Services, Inc. 
50 W. Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-*> / -J' J/ < , 
T 
